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European lawyers with a comprehensive, literary statement of a great mass of
legal rules-the Corpues Juris. As a natural result, the civil lawyer's attention
traditionally centered on written texts; the academic lawyer took a place at the
center of the system. In the long run, a speculative, rational and systematic
approach to legal science was encouraged.' The civil law, instead of focusing its
attention on the law currently administered in the courts, has thus historically
emphasized a general body of rules in the conviction that, though they might
not now be, they would in due time become the law in action.
Professor Lawson also discusses in admirable fashion many of the concepts
today found in the civil and the common laws, considering particularly the
extent to which these concepts have produced results different from those
which the systems might have reached through a purely functional approach to
the problems to be resolved. The continental classification as a part of property
2
law of many matters that we treat in the law of torts furnishes one example.
In German law, problems handled in the common law under the tort rules relating to nuisance are treated as going to the ambit of ownership and form part
of the law of property. "[Tihis attitude of mind led German law to limit the
remedy, if no fault were proved in the neighbor, to a declaration or injunction"
(p. 144). The problems of formation and form in the law of contracts are further
areas in which the stock of concepts with which the various systems operate
have had profound implications for the solution of practical problem.'
A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law contains abundantly the insights
of the learned and wise scholarship of one whose interests led him beyond the
confines of his native legal system to a profound study of the legal systems of
continental Europe.
ARTmUR TAYLOR VON

MEHREN*

* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
'See generally pp. 62-81, 161-69.
2See pp. 143-45.
3See pp. 113-35, 148-52, 157-73; for another discussion of certain of these problems consuit von Mehren, The French Civil Code and Contract-a Comparative Analysis of Formation and Form, 15 La. L. Rev. 687 (1955).

Transnational Law. By Philip C. Jessup. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1956. Pp. 113. $3.00.
This little book contains the three Storrs lectures delivered by Professor
Jessup at Yale last winter. Within the tradition of those lectures, made great
by such as Cardozo, Pound, Becker, Hutchins and Radin, Jessup wrestles with
large jurisprudential problems. He focuses attention upon neglected areas of
what he calls "transnational law" and suggests an approach which is quite different-and much more sensible-than that of more traditional scholarship.
"Law" for Jessup is composed of all rules and practices which regulate ac-
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tions and events. When those actions and events transcend in any aspect a
national frontier, then the "law" which regulates, whatever its formal origin
and whoever the lawmaker may be, is "transnational." Thus transnational law
includes both public and private international law as well as national laws which
control transnational events. Nor does his concept stop with formal enactments.
He includes the rules and processes of public and private agencies dealing with
transuational facts; for example, the United Nations, European Payments
Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Achnacarry Agreement between the Standard Oil of New Jersey, Shell Oil and Anglo-Persian Oil
Companies.
By employing such a broad-gauged view Jessup seeks to open up to the domain of legal scholarship a large and important area of rules and practices now
too often arbitrarily excluded by a priori classification. By using new language
he hopes to avoid sterile debate as to the content of "international law" and the
all-or-nothing consequences which can flow from too-rigid categorization into
rules governing states in their inter-sovereign relations on the one hand, and
the several national laws on the other. The resolution of transnational problems,
whoever the decision-maker, requires more flexibility than contemporary
theory would allow. In addition, there is a body of experience in the decisions
of various international agencies which fits neither category comfortably, if at
all, but which illustrates the approach to problems which Jessup recommends.
In a sense it is a return to an older "natural law" tradition, atrophied by nineteenth-century formalism, but capable of rebirth through comparative techniques.
The theme of the lectures is suggested by the title of the opening chapter,
"The Universality of the Human Problems." Here, in a very engaging and
sometimes convincing way, Jessup posits a similarity between many transnational and national problems in terms of human wants, needs and aspirations.
Many of the problems which now are a source of dispute and tension in the
transnational arena have had their national counterparts and have become, in
fact, transnational merely because of the essentially irrelevant and accidental
interposition of boundaries in a shrinking world. Solution of these problems at
a national level within the various states has given us a fund of common experience and law, national in origin but relevant in its essential principles to the
solution of transnational problems. Point Four, for example, is a transnational
application of the old AAA; there is an analogy between the Populist and
Granger movements of the old West and the socialist-nationalist aspirations of
the contemporary East. The conditions and forces which make for transnational
difficulties have often had domestic counterparts for the reason that they are
the human problems of an industrializing and democratizing society: poverty,
political participation and the difficult adjustment and compromise of group
differences in a rapidly changing social structure.
In his next two lectures Jessup examines some existing doctrine of interna-
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tional law and conflict of laws with regard to "jurisdiction" and "choice of law."
It should surprise no one that he finds it wanting. At heart the difficulty lies
with a basic orientation toward the status of the decision-maker rather than the
practical problem to be resolved. The competency of the decision-maker should
be related not to geography but rather to considerations of the convenience and
needs of the international community. Jurisdiction, Jessup believes, is largely
a matter of procedure, not "power" or "territorial sovereignty," and the cases
should be re-examined and re-shuffled accordingly. There is sufficient common
ground, as indicated by similar domestic practices, to make such an approach
feasible.
What is true of jurisdiction is also true of choice of law. Here Jessup reviews
the too-little examined experience of international agencies faced with something akin to choice of law problems. In these cases he finds little use of conflicts
rules as such, though he does find much reference to the various national laws
for the purpose of shaping rules which conform to reason and justice in the light
of the facts of the particular controversies. It is an experience which gives
authority to his general theme and one which, obviously, he would favor extending to all arenas in which transnational disputes are resolved. Because experience with transnational agencies to determine transnational rules has been
favorable and because there are in many areas developed bodies of national
experience with regard to similar problems upon which they can freely draw,
Jessup favors more use of transnational groups, such as UN agencies, both to
formulate transnational rules and to decide transnational disputes.
It is apparent from even this brief summary that Jessup has put a good deal
into a few pages. He has done so in a manner which is eminently readable. His
style is simple and direct. Like the man himself there is no pretension and much
wit and wisdom. Throughout he reflects a tolerance of different views, an awareness of the limitations of easy solutions, a deep understanding of human foibles
and the pains of social growth. These are qualities which made Jessup an outstanding diplomat and they are no less essential ingredients of effective
scholarship.
I agree with Jessup that a broad view of law is indispensable to both understanding its role in transnational society and to suggesting creative and workable solutions to transnational problems. Domestically we do not attempt to
separate law from the socio-political processes of the community though we do,
of course, seek to guide and limit the authority of particular decision-makers.
In our own society we have experienced tremendous evolution in power processes and hence in the legal system. Much parental authority has passed from
the family to the teacher and to the non-parental employer as well as to private
and public social agencies. A prior judicial authority to formulate policy now
rests with other officials in a new governmental complex. The employer and the
land owner have been bureaucratized. As society has become more complex and
interdependent we have seen the law, and the need for law, grow with it. The
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employer no longer relies on personal supervision and ad hoc decisions; administration involves complicated delegations of authority ("jurisdiction") through
tables of organization, budgets and formal company rules and policies. Legislatures have adopted increasing numbers of rules and practices for doing business, dividing authority and function among their members, sometimes formally
and sometimes through custom. In all aspects of community life law grows in
direct proportion to the complexity of the needs of its members. It is no monopoly of courts and judges, and a conception geared to statutes and cases, to only
the most formal body of doctrine, is wholly inadequate. Yet it is this conception
of law as a body of binding and formal rules which dominates, and suffocates,
scholarship in the international arena.
It is only too apparent that law in the world community is growing rapidly.
In the past few months there have been particularly dramatic incidents. One
need only look at the consequences of Eden's failure to consult the United States
on his Middle East venture. Jessup's transnational lawyer would, I think, be
sensitive to the problem of common interest and divided power. He might not
feel ready to formulate a hard and fast rule of "consultation," but neither would
he draw unwarranted inferences from this difficulty. At the very least he would
have a sense of direction.
There are other transnational problems less fluid and less politically charged
where, as Jessup points out, we are more nearly ready to formalize rules and
delegate authority. Unhappily the doctrine which does exist is not merely inadequate but a positive handicap to common sense. Jessup has inventoried a
portion of these Augean stables. To cleanse them we must deal directly with the
problems raised by multiple authority in regulating transnational events. This
process will undoubtedly involve new institutions of the type he indicates.
In guiding these new institutions Jessup suggests we draw heavily upon
national experience with like problems. There is much merit in this suggestion,
particularly because of its capacity to merge our legal systems and build in a
lawyer-like way upon a body of existing experience. But we will need to clarify
both our assumptions and our objectives in a somewhat sharper manner than
is possible in three lectures or one review. I would give more emphasis than does
Jessup to insights into the legal and political processes which other social scientists can offer to this task. He stops well short of what has already been proposed in the more comprehensive and systematic work of McDougal,' though
in other respects their views are quite compatible.
Actually Jessup is something less of an iconoclast than he likes to picture
himself. Certainly one exposed to the McDougal cosmology finds it difficult to
characterize TransnationalLaw as too extreme. Perhaps this accounts for my
feeling that the merits of this book are more in its potential impact than its
novelty. I do not mean to suggest that Jessup is merely a sheep in wolf's
'McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 Recued des Cours 137 (1953).
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clothing. Actually the implications of what he suggests could be quite farreaching. But his presentation is so moderate, so craftsmanlike, such a skillful
blend of old and new, that one hopes even the most timid and myopic may be
beguiled into inching forward.
International law is a field of legal scholarship where the ratio of useful ideas
to printer's ink consumed is, to put it mildly, sub-marginal. These lectures are
an exception. Perhaps the respect with which their author is so generally
regarded will help to make them influential in directing scholarship into some
of the productive channels he suggests. One can at least hope.
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